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Abstract: We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species hazard in the 
context  of  imperfect  competition,  two-way  trade,  and  multilateral  trade  liberalization,  three 
major  actual  features  of  agricultural  trade  and  policies  in  the  real  world.  We  revisit  the 
reciprocal-dumping model with differentiated products, adding trade and agricultural policies 
into the framework in the presence of invasive-species risk associated with agriculture. We look 
at joint reduction of agricultural tariffs. This type of trade integration is much more likely to 
increase the damage from invasive species than predicted by unilateral trade liberalization under 
the  classical  HOS  framework.  We  document  the  non-monotonic  relationship  between  policy 
(trade barriers and farm subsidies) and the expected damages from invasive species. We illustrate 
our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.    1 
Intra-Industry Trade, Imperfect Competition, Trade Integration and Invasive Species Risk 
1. Introduction 
The links between international trade and the environment, are multiple, complex and have been 
a topic of continuing heated debate (Copeland and Taylor; Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der 
Mensbrugghe). International trade can be an important driver of environmental change. In the 
1990s a related literature has emerged on the interface between trade and sanitary and phyto 
sanitary (SPS) issues (see Beghin and Bureau for a review). A more recent literature is emerging 
at the triple interface of trade, the environment and SPS issues, namely on trade and invasive 
species (IS), with a focus on accidental introductions of exotic species like pests, weeds, and 
viruses, by way of trade (Perrings, Williamson and Dalmazzone; Mumford). The trade-SPS-
environment interface is almost inherent to the economics of IS since trade is a major vector of 
propagation of these species, although it is not the only one.
1 Many papers in this new literature 
are focused on the “right” criteria to use or the optimal environmental policy response to the 
hazard of IS (Sumner; Binder) and around quarantine as a legitimate policy response to phyto-
sanitary risk (Cook and Frazer; Anderson et al.). Our paper contributes to this new literature on 
trade and IS risk in the specific context of agricultural markets and trade. 
  Agricultural  imports  have  always  been  an  important  conduit  for  biological  invasions 
(CABI). Despite of the Uruguay Round Agreement of the WTO, protection remains high in 
agriculture and its reduction in future trade agreements will influence agricultural trade patterns 
and associated IS damages. Elucidating the impact of the structure of agricultural protection on 
IS hazards and damages is an important question. In a standard one-way trade Hechsher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) model, Costello and McAusland show that lowering agricultural tariffs could 
lower the damage from exotic species, even though the volume of trade rises and the rate of IS 
                                                 
1 “Natural” invasions occur because of natural vectors (weather related ones, animal migration).   2 
introduction  rises,  because  an  increase  in  imports  results  in  a  reduced  domestic  agricultural 
output. Thus the crop volume susceptible and available for damage and the land area potentially 
affected by the pest are reduced, hence damages can be reduced as well leading to an ambiguous 
effect of trade on IS damages.  
  Our  paper  builds  upon  the  enquiry  of  Costello  and  McAusland.  We  make  major 
departures by analyzing the linkage between protectionism and damages from IS in the context 
of imperfect competition, two-way trade and multilateral trade liberalization. Intra-industry trade 
and imperfect competition characterize agricultural trade patterns in the real world. For example, 
wheat  trade  is  oligopolistic  and  wheat  is  a  differentiated  commodity  with  most  countries 
importing and exporting wheat (See Table 1). Two-way trade patterns hold even more for more 
broadly defined commodities such as coarse grains as shown in table 2. The HOS framework has 
limited empirical relevance in this context.  
We also depart with the previous analysis by considering multilateral trade liberalization. 
Trade integration occurs mostly through multilateral or regional agreements (e.g., The Uruguay 
Round of the WTO, NAFTA). Seldom do countries engage in unilateral trade liberalization but 
rather commit to jointly reduce their protection through regional or multilateral agreements.
2 
Another argument to consider joint reforms is that transaction costs have been falling for both 
exports  and  imports  through  cheaper  transportation,  cheaper  refrigeration  and  insurance,  etc. 
Joint tariff reduction mimics the joint lowering of transaction costs on both sides of any border.  
  We revisit the reciprocal dumping model considering differentiated products and adding 
trade into the framework. We consider joint tariff reductions and their effect on expected IS 
damage. We find that this type of trade integration is much more likely to increase expected 
                                                 
2 There are exceptions such as New Zealand’s unilateral trade liberalization in the 1980s but by and large joint 
reforms are much more common (Bhagwati).   3 
damage from exotic species in our  two-way trade model, as compared to unilateral liberalization 
and on-way trade. Hence the unexpected ambiguity of Costello and McAusland is much reduced 
in with our more realistic setup.  
Domestic farm subsidies are another consideration. Agriculture in OECD countries is 
characterized by heavy subsidies which have to some extent, substituted for the lower border 
protection (OECD). Since 1996 these subsidies have been  slowly reduced as part of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). The current Doha round is also considering sharper 
reductions in production subsidies in agriculture. We incorporate this second-best dimension of 
domestic subsidies in our analysis of trade integration and their role on IS risk introduction and 
damages. We document the non-monotonic relationship between protection structure (border and 
domestic policies) and damages from exotic species introduction. We focus on the key role of 
domestic subsidies and their reform to either increase or decrease IS introduction and damage. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The trade model is presented next. 
Section 3 models the IS introduction. Then the linkage between trade reform and IS introduction 
is  then  established.  We  illustrate  and  examine  the  robustness  of  the  results  in  section  5  by 
calibrating the analytical model to recent data on wheat trade and the associated damages from 
exotic species. Summary remarks then conclude the paper. 
 
2. A segmented-market model with differentiated product 
Assume that there are two countries, Home and Foreign, and that each country has one firm 
producing commodity Z. Assume that each firm regards each country as a separate market and 
therefore chooses the profit-maximizing quantity for each country separately by making price 
discrimination of the third degree. The Home firm produces output x for domestic consumption   4 
and output x* for Foreign consumption. Similarly, the Foreign firm produces output y for export 
to Home, and output y* for its own market. The idea was first proposed by Brander (1981) and 
elaborated by Brander and Krugman (1983).  
  Assume that Home good and Foreign good are imperfect substitutes in each market such 
that the Home demands for domestic good and imports are 
(1)  ( , ) x y x x x y x p p a b p kp = - + , and  
(2)  ( , ) x y y y y x y p p a b p kp = - + , 
where  ( , ) X Y p p  are price of Home and Foreign goods in the Home market. All parameters are 
assumed to be positive and so is expression x b b k -
2
y  by integrability of a demand system derived 
by maximizing a quasi-linear utility under budget constraint (see appendix 1).  
Similarly, Foreign demands for its own domestic good and the imports are 
(3) 
* * * * *
* *( , ) x y y y y x y p p a b p kp = - + , and 
(4) 
* * * * *
* *( , ) x y x x x y x p p a b p kp = - + . 
Again, all parameters are assumed to be positive and so is expression * x b b k -
2
y* . 
  Assume  that  Home  and  Foreign  governments  impose  tariffs  on  imports  ( , *) t t   and 
subsidize their production  ( ) , * s s  with subsidies being proportional to their unit cost, c. Tariffs 
and subsidies are expressed in ad valorem rate. Home and Foreign firm’ problems are 
(5) [ ] ( ) ( )
*
* * *
. . .{ , }
( , , ) (1 ) , (1 ) (1 ) * (1 *),
x x
x x y x x y
w r t p p
Max p s p c s x p p p c s x p p FC p t t t   = - - + + - - + -  
￿ ￿
, and 
(6) ( ) ( )
*
* * *
. . .{ , }
*( , , *) (1 *) , (1 ) (1 *) * (1 *), *
y y
y x y y x y
w r t p p




* * ( , , , ) x x y y p p p p p =
￿
,  ( , *) t t t =
￿
, and FC and FC* are fixed costs of the Home 
and Foreign firm. This setting is similar to the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander and   5 
Krugman  (1983),  except  that  these  authors  worked  with  homogenous  goods  and  did  not 
introduce trade and agricultural policies into the analysis. The Home firm’s best responses are 
(7)  [ ] { } ( ) (1 ) (1 ) /2
H
x y x x y x BR p a b c s k p b t = + - + + , and 
(8)  { }
* * * *
* * ( ) (1 )(1 *) /2 (1 *)
H
x y x x y x BR p a b c s kp b t t   = + - + + +   . 
The Foreign firm’s best responses are 
(9)  { } ( ) (1 *)(1 ) /2 (1 )
F
y x y y x y BR p a b c s kp b t t   = + - + + +   , and 
(10)  { }
* * * *
* * ( ) (1 *) (1 *) /2
F
y x y y x y BR p a b c s k p b t   = + - + +   . 
Equilibrium in the two countries’ markets can be solved independently. That is, equations 
(7)  and  (9)  simultaneously  define  the  equilibrium  prices  in  the  Home  markets( ) , x y P P ,  and 
equations  (8)  and  (10)  simultaneously  define  the  equilibrium  prices  in  the  Foreign 
markets( )
* * , x y P P .  Appendix  2  establishes  the  existence  and  uniqueness  of  the  Bertrand 
equilibrium in our model; two-way trade exists given arbitrary trade and agricultural policies.  
  Home and Foreign equilibrium quantities consumed for both goods are  
(11)  { }
2 ( , ) 2 (1 )( 2 ) (1 *)(1 )
x
x y y x y y
b
X s a b ka c s k b b kb s
D
t t = + + - - + - +
￿
,  
(12)  { }
2 ( , ) 2 (1 ) ( 2 )(1 *)(1 )
y
y x x x x y
b
Y s a b ka ckb s c k b b s
D
t t = + + - + - - +
￿
, 
(13)  { }
*
* * * 2 * * * *( , *) 2 (1 *)( 2 ) (1 )(1 *)
*
x
x y y x y y
b
X s a b ka c s k b b kb s
D
t t = + + - - + - +
￿
, and 
(14)  { }
*
* * * * 2 * * *( , *) 2 (1 *) ( 2 )(1 )(1 *)
*
y
y x x x x y
b
Y s a b ka ckb s c k b b s
D
t t = + + - + - - +
￿
,  
with ( , *) s s s =
￿
, 
2 * * 2 4  and  * 4 x y x y D b b k D b b k º - º - .  Home  equilibrium  production  is   6 
( , ) ( , ) *( , *) Q s X s X s t t t = +
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
. 
  We use the following intermediate results, which are derived in appendix 3. 
Corollary 1: Given the demand structure as specified in equations (1)-(4), the following relations 
hold in equilibrium: (i)  */ 0 X t ¶ ¶ = ,  */ 0 X s ¶ ¶ > ,  */ * 0 X t ¶ ¶ < ,  */ * 0 X s ¶ ¶ < ;  
(ii)  / 0 X t ¶ ¶ > ,  / 0 X s ¶ ¶ > ,  / * 0 X t ¶ ¶ = ,  / * 0 X s ¶ ¶ < ;  (iii)  / 0 Q t ¶ ¶ > ,  / 0 Q s ¶ ¶ > , 
/ * 0 Q t ¶ ¶ < ,  / * 0 Q s ¶ ¶ < ; and (iv)  / 0 Y t ¶ ¶ < ,  / 0 Y s ¶ ¶ < ,  / * 0 Y t ¶ ¶ = ,  / * 0 Y s ¶ ¶ > . 
The comparative-statics of policy reform 
We now consider the effects of trade integration and domestic reforms on Home import and 
Home production in equilibrium. Recall that under the URAA, WTO member countries had to 
achieve  two  major  policy  changes.  First,  “tariffication”  and  market  access  had  to  occur. 
Countries had to convert quantitative restrictions on imports into bound tariffs, and then reduce 
these  tariffs  over  an  implementation  period,  and  open  their  markets  to  imports  under  the 
minimum access provision. Second, a reduction of distorting domestic support was implemented 
to limit and reduce the most trade-distorting forms of domestic subsidies. We parameterize these 
reforms in our model as a joint reduction of tariffs and production subsidies as follows.  
Assume  that  trade  negotiations  yields  the  joint  trade  policy  reform  outcome 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = - ,  i.e.,  a  proportional  decrease  of  tariffs,  where  k   is  any  arbitrary  positive 
fraction. We also look at the case in which domestic policy is also reduced. To simplify the 
comparative-statics we assume that the reduction in domestic subsidies is a fraction α of the tariff 
reduction or   and  * * ds d ds d a t a t = = .
3  
                                                 
3 Alternatively one could consider that domestic support actually endogenously increases by political economic 
forces to offset the loss of border protection.   7 
  Totally differentiate Home  equilibrium production  ( , ) Q s t
￿ ￿







* * * *
* * .
* *
Q Q Q Q
dQ d d ds ds
s s
Q d Q d Q d Q d
s s




t t t t
t t at at
t t t t t t
k t t at at
t t
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + + +
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
= + + +
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶   = - + + +   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  
     
Similarly, we obtain the following by taking total differentiation of  ( , ) Y s t
￿
: 





k t at at
t
¶ ¶ ¶   = - + +   ¶ ¶ ¶  
 
  We will use equations (15) and (16) in different trade “integration” and domestic reform 
scenarios to examine the relation between trade and domestic policy reforms and the damages 
from exotic species. We consider the following scenarios: 
1.  Only trade policies are active and reformed, i.e.  * 0 s s = = , and 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = - . 
2.  Both  trade  and  agricultural  policies  are  active,  but  only  tariffs  are  lowered, 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = -  and  * 0 ds ds = = , although s and s* are different from zero. 
3.  Both trade and agricultural policies are active, but only Home government subsidizes 
their production, i.e.  * 0 s = . Trade and agricultural policy reforms take place such that 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = -  and ds d a t = . 
4.  Both trade and agricultural policies are active. Trade and agricultural policy reforms take 
place such that 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = - ,   and  * * ds d ds d a t a t = = . 
 
                                                 
4 Since   and  * *. ds d ds d a t a t = =    8 
3. Modeling IS hazard and policy interface 
We elaborate on the framework followed by Costello and McAusland accounting for our setup 
with an oligopolistic industry, two-way trade and multilateral trade reforms. We assume that the 
arrival time of exotic species is stochastic and that the inter-arrival time between two successive 
introductions is an exponentially distributed random variable with mean 1/g . Assume that g  is 
increasing in the volume of imports Y. Adopting Costello and McAusland’s formulation, we 
write the expected value of type-k damage through time T as 
(17) 
0 [ ( )] ( ) ( , )
T k k
t E D T Y E F Q dt d rg d = ∫ , 
where  r  is the probability that an introduced species established a viable population in Home, 
and  ( , )
k
t F Q d  is the cumulative density function for the present value of type k damage through 
time T caused by the 
th i  successful introduction  ( )
k
i D T , conditional on  i t , that is the probability 
that a successful arrival at time  i t  has a present value of type-k damage by time T of less than d , 
given the total production Q. 
  To understand the effect of trade liberalization on the damage from exotic species, we 
seek the sign of the total derivative 
(18)  [ ] [ ] * * * * * * * * Q s s Y s s dED F Q d Q ds Q d Q ds F Y d Y ds Y d Y ds t t t t rg t t rg t t = + + + + + + + , 
where 
0 ( , )
T k




d d t t
k
t t






Q Q Y Y
Q Q Y Y
s s s s
F F




Q Y Q Y
F F
t t t t
g g




at at at at
g g
 
+ + +  
  = -
 
+ + + +  
 
 or   9 
 
* *
* * ( ) / ( ) */ *
Q Q Y Y
Q Q s s s s Y Y
F F Q Y Q Y
F F Q Y Q Y F
s s
t t t t g g
g g
e e e e e e e e
krg
e e e e at e e e e at
  + + +
= -  
+ + + +    
, 
where 
Q F e  is the elasticity of expected k damage to the level of agricultural activity, 
Y g e  is the 
elasticity of the arrival rate with respect to the volume of imports, and   and 
Q Y j j e e are elasticities 
of Home production and imports with respect to a policy  ( , *, , *) s s j t t = .
5 Variable F is positive 
as long as expected type-k damage is positive, which we assume to be the case.  0
Y g e >  by 
assumption that high volume of imports increases the arrival rate of success of exotic species 
introductions. Damages are called augmented (neutral, or diminished) if they increase (remain 
unchanged, or decrease) as the level of agricultural activity increases (Costello and McAusland). 
Using this classification, the sign of 
Q F e  can be determined as the following: 
0 augmented
0  if the damages are  neutral .
0 diminished
Q F e
>    
    =    
    <    
 The first two cases (
Q F e ≥0) are the most relevant 
cases. The signs of the policy effect on imports and productions are left to be determined, and 
they vary with different policy scenarios.  
 
4. Policy reforms impact on damages from IS introduction 
We start with scenarios 1 and 2, that is, policy reform only concerns trade and leads to lower 
tariffs  or 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = - .  Under  these  policy  scenarios,  equation  (16)  becomes 
                                                 




* * * *
* *
Q Q Y Y
Q Q s Y s s Y s
F Q F Q Q Y Y Q Y Y
F Q Y F Q Y
dED F
F Q F Q Q s Y Y s Q s Y Y s
F Q s Y s F Q s Y s
t t t t t g t t g t
g g
krg
at g at at g at
g g
 
+ + +  
  = -
 
+ + + +  
 




dY k t t
t t
¶ ¶   = - +   ¶ ¶  
. 
Proposition 1: Given the demand structure (1)-(4), a joint tariff reduction without  domestic 
policy reform increases the rate of successful IS introduction to Home.  
Proof: See Appendix 4. 
The proposition points out the straightforward relation between trade integration and the rate of 
successful introductions of IS. Trade integration via multilateral trade liberalization increases 
imports, hence the platform for IS introduction. One should however, remember that not all 
successful introductions cause damages,  and that the  extent of damages is endogenous. The 
correlation between trade liberalization and damages caused by exotic species is represented by 
equation (19) under scenario 1, or 
* * Q Q Y Y F F Q Y Q Y dED F
t t t t g g krg e e e e e e e e   = - + + +  . 
Hence, the expected change in damages has four components corresponding to the two policy 
types (tariffs, production subsidies), and the two vectors (production, imports).  
Proposition  2: Given the demand structure  (1)-(4), a joint tariff reduction without domestic 
























Proof: The proposition follows directly from applying elements of corollary 1 to equation (19). 
QED.  
To provide intuition, we compare the IS damages induced by the trade reform in our imperfect- 
competition and two-way trade setup to the outcome in the one-way trade cum unilateral reform 
case. The “one-way trade” context can be interpreted in our framework as when the Home firm’s   11 
export X* does not exist.
6 Therefore, the demand system is characterized only by equations (1), 
(2) and (4). A Bertrand equilibrium exists and is unique in this “one-way trade” version of the 
model (See appendix 5). As a result, the relation between trade reform and the damages from the 
exotic species in the one-way trade model is characterized by equation (20) but with 
* Qt e =0. 
Corollary 2 follows this argument. 
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The counter-intuitive part of proposition 2 and corollary 2 is that the trade integration could leads 























. Assuming damages are augmented, i.e. 
0
Q F e > ,  the  underlying  outcome  is  much  less  likely  to  occur  in  a  two-way-trade  cum 
multilateral-reform  situation  than  in  a  one-way-trade  cum  unilateral  reform  case,  since  by 
corollary 1, 
* 0
Qt e < . The oligopolistic nature of our model here is not crucial to obtain this 
decrease in ambiguity. One should notice that it is reasonable to compare the two conditions for 
two-way  and  one-way  trade  since,  though  the  two-way  trade  occurs  which  leads  to 
* Q X X t t t = + , by element (i) of corollary 1, 
* 0 Xt = . Therefore, corollary 2 still holds.  
  The possibility that trade liberalization reduces the damages caused by exotic species 
exists because total production of Home may decrease. The reply of Home production to trade 
                                                 
6 This situation can be justified as i) if Home products do not generate any utility to the foreign consumers. Hence 
the foreign utility is of the form 
2
* * *( *) * 0.5 * y y u y A y B y = - ; or ii) if foreign purchasers do want to consume 
Home products, but their demand is not high enough to be realized (i.e. 
*
x a  is so small that  * 0 x £ ).   12 
reform in these scenarios is represented by 
 (21’)        *
*
Q Q
dQ k t t
t t
¶ ¶   = - +   ¶ ¶  
. 
By (21’) and elements of corollary 1, the following holds 
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This condition tells us that to have  0 dY >  and  0 dQ > , Home pre-reform tariff must not be “too 
high” relative to the Foreign pre-reform tariff. Further and for sake of intuition, let’s assume 
some symmetric price responses such that  * x y b b b = =  and  * * x y b b b = = , i.e. the own-price and 
cross-price effects are the same in the two markets, but the size of the market (the intercepts of 
the demands) is different. Then (23) becomes
2 2 *









< º . It is worth to notice 
that  1 w > . This leads to a corollary. 
Corollary 3: Given the demand structure (1)-(4), and assuming  * x y b b b = =  and  * * x y b b b = = , 
multilateral trade reform involving joint tariff reduction always increases expected damages, if i) 
Home pre-reform tariff is lower than foreign pre-reform tariff, or if ii)   Home  pre-reform 
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, the condition is more likely to hold for large b and b* and for small k, i.e.,   13 
for large own-price effects and/or for small degree of substitution between foreign and home 
goods. This corollary suggests that a relatively open country liberalizing its trade with a more 
protectionist partner will face increase expected damages, other things being equal.  
  Next we consider scenarios 3 and 4. Both trade and agricultural distortions are in place. 
Proposition 3: Given the demand structure (1)-(4), and assuming both trade and agricultural 
policies active, then trade and domestic reforms 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = - ,  ds d a t =  and  * * ds d a t = ,  
increase the rate of successful IS introduction to Home. 
Proof: See appendix 6. Since subsidies and tariffs provide parallel protection in both countries, 
their reduction have parallel influences on IS introduction. 
Proposition 4: Given the demand structure (1)-(4),  
i)  if  both  trade  and  agricultural  policies  exist,  then  the  reform 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
= = - , 









 the expected damages if and only if   
(24)  ( ) ( )
* * * / */ * / */ *
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>
; 
ii)  if  both  trade  and  agricultural  policies  exist  but  only  Home  government  subsidizes  its 
production, then the policy reform 
*
*
d d t t
k
t t
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Proof: i) The result follows directly from applying elements of the corollary 1 to equation (24).    
ii)  If  the  Foreign  Government  does  not  subsidizes  their  production,  the  s*  is  irrelevant  in 
equation (24).      Q.E.D. 
In  the  presence  of  both  trade  policy  and  production  subsidy,  not  only  the  Home   14 
production’s reply to trade reform is non-monotonic, but also is the Home’s imports. The non-
monotonicity of production in this case can be seen by expressing (15) in terms of elasticity, 
which leads to 
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There are large and increasing differences in the levels of support and market protection among 
OECD countries, reflecting different historical uses of policy instruments, and the varying pace 
and degree of progress in agricultural policy reform. For the 2000-02 period, the average PSE 
was below 5% in Australia and New Zealand, below 25% for the United States, 35% in the 
European  Union  and  around  60%  for  Japan,  Korea  among  others  (figure  2).  Support  to 
Australian agriculture, for example, is extremely low and domestic producer prices, which were 
on average 5% higher than world price in the mid-1980s, have been broadly aligned with world 
prices since 2001 (OECD, 2003, page 120). Proposition 4(i) can refer to the trade activities 
between the US and EU or Japan, while US-Australia or US-New Zealand exchange could be the 
case in proposition 4(ii). 
 
5.  Calibration of the wheat model in the presence of IS 
Wheat provides an excellent opportunity to illustrate our analytical results. Wheat trade can be a 
major vector of  IS (CABI), and as mentioned before wheat is differentiated and its trade is 
oligopolistic. Table 1 summarizes the bilateral trade on wheat between the US, the European 
Union 15 (EU), Canada and the “rest of the world” in the marketing year of July 2001-June 
2002. There is a large two-way trade between the US and Canada: 98% of US wheat imports 
come from Canada, while 25% of Canada wheat imports are from the US. In total, EU’s total 
wheat imports are almost as large as its total wheat exports. Therefore, to illustrate the theoretical   15 
findings in the previous sections, we calibrate the model using data on wheat production and 
trade and on invasive species associated with wheat for the four-country case (the US, the EU, 
Canada, and the rest of the world (ROW)).  
  Table 3 indicates the summary policy distortions at the border and farm subsidies for 
major players in the wheat market for 2001 using OECD and WITS data. As noted by Mitchell 
and Mielke, despite these significant achievements in improved rules for trade with the URAA, 
the  amount  of  trade  liberalization  achieved  in  wheat  was  modest  because  of  the  way  these 
reforms were done. Many countries applied the Uruguay Round provisions so that they could 
protect producers in key sectors from foreign competition. Applied tariffs were often set high 
and bound tariffs were often set even higher which leaves open the possibility of future increases 
in applied tariffs. Wheat export subsides have been largely eliminated, but the possibility they 
could be resumed remains. Implementation of minimum access and tariff reduction has also met 
with problems as countries have introduced new measures to offset agreed reforms. 
  While trade barrier has the tendency to reduce, the domestic policies still support and 
protect the agriculture activities. In 2002, for the OECD countries, the level of support to 
producers stabilized, but with a slight increase in protection and a slight reduction in market 
orientation. Support to producers for the OECD as a whole, as measure by the %PSE, remained 
unchanged at 31% in 2002 compared to 2001 (Figure 1, OECD 2003). For the three-year period 
2000-2002, the %PSE averaged 31% compared with the 1986-88 average of 38%. In output-
linked support, the nominal rate of protection, as measure by the producer nominal assistance 
coefficients increased slightly with average producer prices 31% above the world price in 2002 
compared to 30% in 2001. 
  Output-linked support reduces the transmission of world price changes to producers and   16 
thus dampens the influence of world market price changes on domestic production decisions. 
Over the long-term market protection has decreased as prices in domestic markets were, on 
average, 57% higher in 1986-88. The nominal assistance coefficient for the whole OECD, as 
measured by the producer NAC, also slightly increased in 2002 compared to 2001 indicating a 
slight reduction in market orientation. Total farm receipt in 2000-02 were on average 46% higher 
than they would have be if entirely generated in markets without any support, while they were 
61% higher in 1986-88. This is an indicator of an improvement in market orientation in terms of 
greater share of farm receipts generated in markets than created by government intervention. 
Structure of the wheat model: 
Equations (1) to (4) specified in the previous section are calibrated to 2001/2 data. To account 
for damages we decompose output into a land component and a yield component. Damages are 
expressed as production losses via decreased yield. This is the way plant pathologists model the 
impact of pest on crops (CABI). We calibrate the four-country model, which are the US, the EU, 
Canada and the rest of the world (ROW), with a vector of exports and imports for each country 
since there are several partners for each country. Wheat is assumed to be differentiated, hence we  
have 4 kinds of wheat: US wheat, EU wheat, Canada wheat, and wheat produced by the rest of 
the world. 
The general framework for each country sub-model consists of the following: 
Planted area:  ( , )
i i i AH f WP AP = , 
Yield:  ( )*(1 )
i i i Y g WP E YL   = -   , 
Wheat production:  *
i i i PROD AH Y = ,   17 
where  { } , , , i US EU CAN ROW = , AH is the acreage, WP denotes the real wheat price, AP 
represents the real price of alternative crops (corn, barley, oats and rye, etc), Y stands for yield, 
YL is the yield loss due to the non-indigenous species and PROD is the wheat production.  
The inventory demands are assumed to be constant across the period. 
  Data for area, yield, production and consumption were gathered from the World Grain 
Statistics of the International Grains Council. Price data were obtained from the USDA, Attaché 
Reports, AgCanada and the International Grains Councils. The protection data were collected 
from the OECD and WITS. Finally, CABI’s Crop Protection Compendium provides most of the 
data for the underlying pests.  Price responses come from the FAPRI elasticity database. 
Damages D of the pest p are expressed in the value of crop losses:  ( )
i i
p E D h E YL     =     . 
Simulated results will be presented at the conference.   18 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Producer Support Estimate (%PSE), Producer Nominal Protection 
Coefficient (NPCp) and Producer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NACp) 
 
 
Figure 2:Producer Support Estimate by country (Percent of value of gross farm receipts) 
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Table 1: Trade in all wheat (including durum wheat), wheat flour and semolina 
Metric tons (wheat equivalent) 
Exporting Country  Importing 
Country  Canada  EU  USA  ROW  Total 
Canada    1,041  25,486  76,915  103,442 
EU  1,232,910    2,234,378  6,849,852  10,317,140 
USA  1,910,964  1,695    46,337  1,958,996 
ROW  12,949,148  10,760,918  24,529,819    96,265,975 
Total  16,093,022  10,763,654  26,789,683  54,999,194  108,645,553 




Table 2: Trade in Coarse Grains (corn, barley, sorghum, oats, rye, millet and trinicale) 
Metric tons 
Exporting Country  Importing 
Country  Canada  EU  USA  ROW  Total 
Canada    160  3,651,002  34,930  3,686,092 
EU  10,388    138,903  4,104,721  4,254,012 
USA  1,795,701  540,169    16,552  2,352,422 
ROW  729,945  4,427,342  52,738,304    95,316,517 
Total  2,536,034  4,967,671  56,528,209  41,577,129  105,609,043 
Source: Wheat and Coarse Grains Shipments 2001/2002, International Grains Council. 
 
 






Canada  53.72  17 
EU  12.80  46 
USA  1.87  42 
Sources: (i): World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) of the World Bank and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). (ii): OECD 2003.   22 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: 
The inverse demands corresponding to equations (1)-(2) are  ( , ) x x x p x y A B x Ky = - - , and  
( , ) y y y p x y A B y Kx = - - .  All  parameters  are  positive  and  so  is  expression
2
x B B K - y .  This 
demand  system  can  be  derived  by  maximizing  quasi-linear  utility,  subject  to  the  budget 
constraint  X Y I z p x p y = + + ,  where I is Home income. The aggregate utility function is of the 
form  ( , ) U z u x y = + ,where z is the aggregate consumption of a competitive numeraire good and 
u is a quadratic function defined by 
2 2 ( , ) 0.5( 2 ) x y x y u x y A x A y B x B y Kxy = + - + + . 
 
Appendix 2: Existence and uniqueness of a Bertrand Equilibrium in the model. 
Given  the  demand  structure  as  specified  in  equations  (1)-(4),  we  show  that  the  Bertrand 
equilibrium  of  the  game  exists  and  is  unique  for  any  ad-valorem  tariffs  ( , *) t t   and  any 
production ad-valorem subsidies { } [ ) , * 0,1 s s Î   proportioning on the production cost.  
Proof: Rewrite the Foreign firm’s best response  ( )
F
y x BR p  under the form  ( )
F
x y BR p , that is 
(14’)      { } ( ) (1 *) 2 (1 )/
F
x y y y y y BR p a b c s b p k t   = - + - + +   . 
The two best responses  ( )
H
x y BR p  and  ( )
F
x y BR p are two linear functions of  y p . One sees that  
/ (1 )/2 2 (1 )/ /
H F
x y x y x y BR p k b b k BR p t t ¶ ¶ = + > + =¶ ¶ . 
On the other hand,  
[ ] 0 0 (1 ) /2 0 (1 *) (1 )/
y y
H F
x p x x x y y x p BR a b c s b a b c s k BR t = =   º + - > >- + - + º   . 
Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium in the Home market which is represented by the intersection 
point of these two linear correspondences always exists and is unique. 
Similar argument holds for the equilibrium in the Foreign market.      Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix 3: Proof of corollary 1.  
By equations (16a)-(16d), we have: 
(i)  */ 0 X t ¶ ¶ = , 
* * * 2 */ (2 )/ * 0 x x y X s b c b b k D ¶ ¶ = - > , 
* * * 2 */ * (2 )(1 )/ * 0 x x y X b c b b k s D t ¶ ¶ = - - - < , 
* * */ * / * 0 x y X s b b ck D ¶ ¶ = - < ; 
(ii)  / (1 *)/ 0 x y X cb b k s D t ¶ ¶ = - > , 
2 / (2 )/ 0 x x y X s cb b b k D ¶ ¶ = - > ,  / * 0 X t ¶ ¶ = , 
/ * (1 )/ 0 x y X s cb b k D t ¶ ¶ = - + < ; 
 (iii)  / (1 *)/ 0 x y Q cb b k s D t ¶ ¶ = - > , 
2 * * * 2 / (2 )/ (2 )(1 *)/ * 0 x x y x x y Q s cb b b k D b b b k D t ¶ ¶ = - + - + > , 
* * 2 / * *(2 )(1 )/ * 0 x y Q cb b b k s D t ¶ ¶ = - - - < , 
* * / * / * (1 )/ 0 x y x y Q s ck b b D b b D t   ¶ ¶ = - + + <   ; and     
(iv) 
2 / (2 )(1 *)/ 0 y x y Y cb b b k s D t ¶ ¶ = - - - < ,  / / 0 x y Y s cb b k D ¶ ¶ = - < ,  / * 0 Y t ¶ ¶ = , 
2 / * (2 )(1 )/ 0 y x y Y s cb b b k D t ¶ ¶ = - + > . Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix 4: Existence and uniqueness of a Bertrand Equilibrium in one-way trade model  
Home firm chooses the price level ( x p ), and foreign firm decides 
* ( , ) y y p p  to maximize its 
profits.  Given  the  demand  structure  as  specified  in  equations  (1),  (2)  and  (8),  the  Bertrand   23 
equilibrium  of  the  game  exists  and  is  unique  for  any  ad-valorem  tariffs  ( , *) t t   and  any 
production ad-valorem subsidies { } [ ) , * 0,1 s s Î   proportioning on the production cost.  
Proof: Expressing the Home and the Foreign firm’s best response under the form  ( ) x y p p , we 
have: [ ] { } ( ) (1 ) (1 ) /2
H
x y x x y x BR p a b c s k p b t = + - + + , and 
{ } ( ) (1 *) 2 (1 )/
F
x y y y y y BR p a b c s b p k t   = - + - + +   . The same argument holds as in appendix 1. 
Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium in the Home market which is represented by the intersection 
point of these two linear correspondences always exists and is unique. 
The equilibrium price in the Foreign market is determined solely by the Foreign firm. That is: 
* * * * (1 *) /2 y y y y P a b c s b   = + -   , which obviously always exists and is unique.  Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix 5 : Proof of proposition 1. 
The rate of successful exotic species introduction to Home is  ( ) ( ) Y Y m rg = . Totally differentiate 






m r kr t t
t t
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶   = = - +   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  
  by (20’). 
Since  / 0 by construction, / 0 and  / * 0 Y Y Y g t t ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ < ¶ ¶ = >  by elements (iv) of corollary 1, it 
must be true that  0 dm > .           Q.E.D. 
 
Appendix 6: Proof of proposition 3. 
Totally differentiate the rate of successful introductions to get  




Y Y s s
g g
m r kr t at at
t
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶   = = - + +   ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶  
 
Substituting  the  expressions  for  * , , and  s s Y Y Y t   from  the  appendix  2  into  equation  (21)  and 
rearranging to get  ( )( )
2 2 1 * / 0 y x y x dY b c b b k s kb D kt a   = - - + >   .   
Since  / 0 Y g ¶ ¶ > , it must be true that  0 dm >  for any  * 0 s ³ .           Q.E.D. 